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"ONE OF THE DIRTY SECRETS OF AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS":t RETALIATION, SURPLUS
POWER, AND WHISTLEBLOWING INMATES
James E. Robertson*
Retaliation is deeply engrained in the correctional office subculture; it may well be
in the normative response when an inmate files a grievance, a statutory precondi-
tion for filing a civil rights action. This Article, the first to address
comprehensively the sociological and constitutional aspects of retaliation, argues
for protecting grievants through safeguards much like those accorded whistleblow-
ers. Part I of the Article provides a socio-legal primer on correctional officer
retaliation by addressing the frequency of retaliation, its causes, and its constitu-
tional taxonomy. Part II describes the elements of a prima facie case of
unconstitutional retaliation under § 1983. Part III examines the controversy over
determining damages, with a single dollar bill symbolizing what prevailing in-
mates can expect from a civil rights suit alleging unconstitutional retaliation.
Part IV contends that inmate grievants possess many of the characteristics of whis-
tleblowers and thus recommends that adverse changes in a grievant's conditions of
confinement within sixty days of filing a grievance ought to create a presumption
of retaliation for administrative purposes, which, unless proven otherwise by clear
and convincing evidence, would trigger administrative remedies intended to make
the inmate whole as well as deter future retaliation.
INTRODUCTION
Inmate Roger Atkinson complained in vain of near-constant ex-
posure to his cellmate's cigarette smoke.' No matter that the
Supreme Court had ruled earlier that environmental tobacco
smoke could inflict cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.! No matter that Atkinson was blind and
diabetic to boot.
3
t John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67
BROOK. L. REv. 429, 431 (2001).
* Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Graduate Research Professor of Corrections &
Correctional Law, Minnesota State University; Editor in Chief, Criminal Law Bulletin. Profes-
sor Robertson received law diplomas from Oxford University and, earlier, from Washington
University in St. Louis. He earned his undergraduate degree, with election to Phi Beta
Kappa, from the University of Washington in Seattle. Professor Robertson is grateful to the
Journars Jennifer Black for her superb "above the line" editing; and to the assistance of Edi-
tor in Chief Amy Cocuzza and Managing Executive Editor Emily A. McCoy.
1. Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 259 (3d Cir. 2003).
2. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
3. Atkinson, 316 E3d at 259.
University of Michigan Journal of Law ReformV
If prison staff saw the blind and diabetic Atkinson as a nuisance
they could ignore, they got it wrong. Alleging cruel and unusual
punishment, Atkinson filed a civil rights action. He later amended
that complaint to include a claim of retaliation for bringing his
lawsuit. 5 Correctional officers allegedly read his mail over the
prison's intercom system for all to hear, refused to provide him
with requested law library materials, barred him from phoning his
attorney, cursed at him, spoke derogatively of his blindness, sub-
jected him to harassing strip searches, and threatened to "smash
his face" and hang him."
Retaliation can take many forms in addition to assault and har-
assment, including fabricated disciplinary charges,7 placement in
segregation,' transfers to less desirable cells9 or prisons, 0 and loss
of prison jobs" or vocational opportunities. 12 Nonetheless, case law
dictates that such claims must be examined "with skepticism and
particular care.... " As the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit explained, "Retaliation claims by prisoners are 'prone to
abuse' since prisoners can claim retaliation for every decision they
dislike."'4
This Article, the first to address the sociological and constitu-
tional aspects of retaliation against inmates, consists of three parts.
Part I provides a socio-legal primer on retaliation against inmates
by addressing the frequency of retaliation, its causes, and its consti-
tutional taxonomy. Part II describes the elements of a prima facie
case of unconstitutional retaliation against an inmate under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.10 Part III examines the controversy over determining
4. See id. at 259-60.
5. See id. at 260-61.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 373-74 (7th Cir. 2005).
8. See, e.g., Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997).
9. See, e.g., Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995).
10. See, e.g., Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 414-15 (6th Cir. 2000).
11. See, e.g., Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002).
12. See, e.g., Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 971 (7th Cir. 2006).
13. Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995); cf James E. Robertson, Psycho-
logical Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A "Not Exactly," Equal Protection Analysis, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 105, 152 (2000) ("For some inmates, litigating conditions of their con-
finement is a means of both coping and resisting.") (footnotes omitted).
14. Graham v. Henderson; 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Flaherty v. Coughlin,
713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983)). One inmate-author wrote that some inmates "relish" filing
grievances for "therapeutic" reasons and to "hinder" a staff member's future attempt for
advancement. MICHAEL G. SANTOS, ABOUT PRISON 136 (2004).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
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damages, with a single dollar bill symbolizing what some prevailing
inmates can expect from a civil rights suit subject to the Prison Liti-
gation Reform Act of 199616 (PLRA). Part IV argues for the revision
of grievance procedures so that inmates facing retaliation enjoy a
legal status similar to that of government whistleblowers. 17 Con-
cluding remarks follow.
I. A PRIMER ON RETALIATION
A. Frequency
Correctional officers who retaliate against inmates cannot be re-
garded as rogue actors. They act within the norm. Vincent
Nathan's groundbreaking survey of Ohio inmates found that
70.1% of inmates who brought grievances indicated that they had
suffered retaliation thereafter; moreover, 87% of all respondents
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action in law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceedings for redress.... For the purposes of this section, any Act
of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to
be a statute of the District of Columbia.
16. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). Long-standing complaints about the in-
trusion of federal courts into the administration of state prisons and voluminous and
allegedly frivolous prisoner litigation resulted in Congress' enactment of this legislation. See,
e.g., United States v. Simmonds, 111 E3d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1997) ("The main purpose of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act was to curtail abusive prison-condition litigation."); Hamp-
ton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The legislation was aimed at the
skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners-many of which are meritless-and the
corresponding burden those filings have placed on the federal courts."); Santana v. United
States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Congress enacted the PLRA primarily to curtail
claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Torts Claims Act, most
of which concern prison conditions and many of which are routinely dismissed as legally
frivolous."); 141 CONG. REc. S14419 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham)
("[N]o longer will prison administration be turned over to Federal judges for the indefinite
future for the slightest reason."), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PIUSON LITIGA-
TION REFORM ACT OF 1996, PUB. L. No. 104-134, at doc. 15141 (1997) (Bernard D. Reams,
Jr. & William H. Manz eds., 1997) [hereinafter 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISON LITI-
GATION REFORM ACT OF 1996, PUB. L. No. 104-134]; 141 CONG. REc. S14418 (daily ed. Sept.
27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (urging legislation to "bring relief to a civil justice sys-
tem overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits"), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1996, PUB. L. No. 104-134 supra, at doc. 14. The
Act has achieved "overkill." See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1555,
1557 (2003) ("[T]he statute seems to be making even constitutionally meritorious cases
harder both to bring and to win.").
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1627 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a whistdeblower as "[aln
employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement
agency"); Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/whistleblowers (defin-
ing a whistleblower as "[o]ne who reveals wrongdoing within an organization to the public
or to those in positions of authority") (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
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and nearly 92% of the inmates using the grievance process agreed
with the statement, "I believe staff will retaliate or get back at me if
I use the grievance process.' ' 8 Among staff supervisors, only 21%
believed that retaliation never happened, with one warden charac-
terizing it as "commonplace" when inmates resort to the grievance
process.' 9 In turn, a New York State study found that more than
half of the inmates filing grievances reported subsequent retalia-
20tion.
Inmates' fear of retaliation deters them from filing grievances.
Some 60% of the prison supervisors surveyed by Nathan re-
sponded that a "substantial number of inmates" do not file
grievances despite having legitimate "issues,,'2 with fear of retalia-
tion coming in a close second among the explanations for this
22phenomenon. Similarly, a study of New York prisoners reached
the same conclusion. 23 "[I] t is clear," writes Professor Nathan, "that
the level of actual retaliation, as well as the perception of likely re-
taliation among ... inmates, is unacceptably high and constitutes
the single most important and difficult obstacle to inmates' use of
the [grievance] system. 2 4 Moreover, when inmates abstain from
filing grievances for fear of retaliation, they cannot bring the un-
derlying complaint to federal court in most instances because the
PLRA requires "exhaustion" as a precondition to filing suit.
25
18. Vincent M. Nathan, Evaluation of the Inmate Grievance System, at 25 (Ohio Dep't
of Rehab. & Corr., Feb. 13, 2001) (on file with author).
19. Id. at 26-27.
20. See Robin L. Dull, Understanding Proper Exhaustion: Using the Special-Circumstances Test
to Fill the Gaps Under Woodford v. Ngo and Provide Incentives for Effective Prison Grievance Proce-
dures, 92 IowA L. REV. 1929, 1959 n.203 (2007) ("Over half of the prisoners who 'actually
filed grievances reported that they had been retaliated against for making a complaint
against staff.'" (quoting Jack Beck, Dir. of the Prison Visiting Project of the Corr. Ass'n of
N.Y., Statement at Public Hearing 4: Oversight, Accountability, and Other Issues (Feb. 9,
2006))). See also Schlanger, supra note 16, at 1578 ("[R]etaliation certainly occurs.") (empha-
sis added).
21. Nathan, supra note 18, at 26-27.
22. See id. at 27, app. at 37, Table Inspector-i1.
23. Dull, supra note 20, at 1958-59.
24. Nathan, supra note 18 at 28.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006) ("No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this tile, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted."). The Supreme Court in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001),
held that this statutory provision requires exhaustion even when the grievance process can-
not provide an appropriate administrative remedy. See id. (arguing that the "statutory
history[] confirms the suggestion that Congress meant to require procedural exhaustion
regardless of the fit between a prisoner's prayer for relief and the administrative remedies
possible"). The Court reaffirmed Booth in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006), in ruling that
the exhaustion requirement dictates that inmates comply with all the prison's administrative
procedures. See id. at 93 ("[W]e are persuaded that the PLRA exhaustion requirement re-
quires proper exhaustion.").
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B. Etiology
Correctional officers possess extensive "surplus power"-a posi-
tive power differential between correctional officers and inmates.
The cell door symbolizes surplus power: 26 Correctional officers, not
inmates, decide when to open and close it. Retaliation against in-
mates represents an extra-legal use of surplus power.
The prison as a "total institution"-where all aspects of an in-
mate's existence, including access to health care, food, exercise,
and other necessities of life, are under the control of a single gov-
ernmental authority2 7-generates abundant surplus power. This
power faces, however, several restraining forces: the expansion of
inmate rights, an oppositional inmate subculture, 9 and a rule-
bound bureaucratic model of governance have constricted sur-
plus power but by no means diminished its utility.
Prisons invest in correctional officers rule enforcement powers
that readily mask retaliatory intent.3 ' As illustrated by rules
26. LORNA A. RHODES, TOTAL CONFINEMENT 57 (2004); see also SANTOS, supra note 14,
at 135 ("Guards have an incredible amount of power over each prisoner's life.").
27. ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961).
The central feature of total institutions can be described as a breakdown of the barri-
ers separating three spheres of life. First, all aspects of life are conducted in the same
place and under the same single authority. Second, each phase of the member's daily
activity is carried on in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of
whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together. Third, all phases
of the day's activities are tightly scheduled .... Finally, the various enforced activity
are brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the of-
ficial aims of the institution.
Id. at 6.
28. See infra note 250 (citing cases).
29. See infra notes 43, 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing the inmate subculture
as oppositional).
30. See infra note 40 (describing the attributes of the bureaucratic prison).
31. SeeJames E. Robertson, "Fight orF.. ."and Constitutional Liberty: An Inmate's Right to
Self-Defense When Targeted by Aggressors, 29 IND. L. REv. 339 (1995).
Inmates are subject to a plethora of prison rules designed to regulate virtually every
aspect of daily life. For instance, Wisconsin's disciplinary code is divided into the fol-
lowing categories of prohibited behavior: 1) bodily security (e.g., assault);
2) institutional security (e.g., inciting a riot); 3) institutional order (e.g., disrespect);
4) property (e.g., theft); 5) contraband (e.g., possession of money); 6) movement
(e.g., loitering); 7) safety and health (e.g., dirty quarters); and 8) miscellaneous (e.g.,
refusal to work). Some of these prohibitions are malum in se and mirror criminal of-
fenses. But the great bulk of prohibitions have no counterpart in the criminal law
and are peculiar to life in "total institutions," where prisoners are stripped of their
autonomy and subjected to round-the-clock surveillance.
Id. at 347 (footnotes omitted).
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sanctioning "insubordination" and "disrespect," the frequent
vagueness of disciplinary rules32 provides correctional officers
ample leeway in deciding when and where to enforce these rules.3
Because inmates acquire "spoiled identities, 34 their claims of
retaliation often carry little credibility in disciplinary hearings-the
effect of which is to ensure that even the wholesale fabrication of
disciplinary incidents will result in official sanctions for inmates.
While procedural safeguards accompany such hearings, 5 they
almost always result in conviction. Consequently, inmates have
long regarded disciplinary hearings as "kangaroo courts" due to
the abundant opportunity for falsifying disciplinary charges.37
Correctional officers' perception of inmates in general as "moral
inferiors who deserve their state of reduced circumstances" 38 le-
32.
It is axiomatic that the more specific the rule, the more rules are required. Aware of
this, prison officials have crafted small collections of vaguely worded "catchall" rules
for their guards to enforce. In turn, guards hold wide authority to proscribe specific
acts, a discretion not uniformly exercised. What, for example, constitutes "insubordi-
nation," "poor work," "disrespect," or "agitation"? Prisoners have had to either guess
at what behavior a given guard will not tolerate or learn by harsh experience.
Douglas Dennis, Foreword: A Consumer's Report, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 1, 12 (1994).
See also, e.g., James E. Robertson, "Catchall" Prison Rules and the Courts: A Study of Judicial Re-
view of Prison Justice, 14 ST. Louis UNIV. PUB. L. REv. 153, 168-69 (1994) (delineating the
types and frequency of vague prison rules); Julia M. Glencer, Comment, An 'Atypical and
Significant' Barrier to Prisoners' Procedural Due Process Claims Based on State-Created Liberty Inter-
ests, 100 DICK. L. REv. 861, 883 n.163 (1996) (stating that "[a] pervasive practice used to
foster the monarchial authority is the vague, catchall prison rule that often sanctions pun-
ishment for otherwise innocent conduct").
33. See, e.g., ROBERT JOHNSON, HARD TIME 125 (2d ed. 1996) (observing that "[m]ost
of their decisions involve discretion").
34. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 8-9
(1963) (defining "spoiled identity" as having a discredited character); see also, e.g., Pamela S.
Karlan, Bringing Compassion Into the Province of Judging: Justice Blackmun and the Outsiders, 71
N.D. L. REv. 173, 176 (1995) (referring to inmates as "the least sympathetic group of 'out-
siders' in our constitutional jurisprudence, since their banishment from free society is the
result of their willful criminal behavior").
35. SeeWolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1974) (delineating procedural safe-
guards such as rights to notice and witnesses).
36. See JAMES STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON RULE VIOLATORS 1
(1989) (reporting a ninety percent conviction rate).
37. SeeWILLIAM K. BENTLEY &JAMES M. CORBETr, PRISON SLANG 11 (1992) (explain-
ing that "[tihe name [kangaroo court] implies an inmate is quickly in and out without any
real justice taking place").
38. JOHN IRWIN, THE WAREHOUSE PISON 65 (2005) (examining the origins of the
conflict between guards and inmates, observing that their training, inculcation of the guard
subculture and interaction with prisoners "results in guards ... distrusting, demeaning, and
often hating prisoners"); see also LEO CARROLL, HACKS, BLACKS AND CONS 47 (1974) (observ-
ing that in a Rhode Island prison, "[h]acks stand on one side of the caste line");JoYCELYN
M. POLLOCK, PRISONS: TODAY AND TOMORROW 309 (1997) ("The relationship between the
correctional officer and inmate is one of 'structured conflict.'") (internal citation omitted);
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gitimates extra-legal, retaliation-based sanctions. John Irwin, a
former inmate himself, believes that guards imbue themselves and
their social control function with a superior moral status in order
to counter sympathy they might have for inmates and the many
deprivations they face. 9
Ironically, correctional officer retaliation sometimes arises from
the diminution of guard authority brought about by the bureauc-
ratization of the prison.4° In the bureaucratic prison, correctional
officers, like the inmates, must conform to "obedience and submis-
sion" rules and regulations.4 ' The grievance process is emblematic
of how the bureaucratic style of prison administration attempts to
rationalize guard power within a rule-bound framework that ac-
cords inmates the opportunity to challenge guard power, especially
their rule enforcement power. Anecdotal accounts suggest that
correctional officers "abhor" responding to inmate grievances pre-
sumably because they are an exercise in scrutinizing officer
conduct.
42
All acts of retaliation occur against a backdrop of two prison
subcultures, each with its own informal code of conduct, each in
opposition to the other. In his seminal study of a New Jersey
prison, Gresham Sykes identified an inmate culture that portrayed
inmates and correctional officers as adversaries.43 Many of its
JEFFREY IAN Ross & STEPHEN C. RICHARDS, BEHIND BARS 47 (2002) ("Within the prison are
two mutually antagonistic groups, the convicts ... and the staff who supervise them.");
Nancy Wolff et al., Physical Violence Inside Prisons, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 588, 597 (2007)
(stating that inmates and custody personnel have "relations often fraught with tension and
hostility").
39. IRWIN, supra note 38, at 65.
40. Irwin and Austin describe the bureaucratic prison as follows:
The lines of authority, as well as the procedures, prescriptions, or guidelines for all
practices, are formalized in the written rules and regulations appearing in elaborate
manuals. An extensive and professionalized training program is needed to keep ...
abreast of the most recent changes in an increasingly complex array of administrative
regulations imposed by the central office.
JOHN IRWIN & JAMES AUSTIN, IT'S ABOUT TIME 69 (2d ed. 1997). "Until the 1960s, legisla-
tures and courts allowed wardens to run largely autonomous prisons. Consequently, wardens
promulgated rules for inmates as they saw fit." James E. Robertson, The Majority Opinion as a
Social Construction of Reality: The Supreme Court and Prison Rules, 53 OKLA. L. REv. 161, 164
(2000).
41. BARBARA A. OWEN, THE REPRODUCTION OF SOCIAL CONTROL 101, 106 (1988) (ex-
amining guard power and asserting that they are "both the subject and object of social
control").
42. SANTOS, supra note 14, at 136.
43. GRESHAM SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 32 (1958). Sykes posited that solidarity
amongst inmates arose as a means of cooperatively addressing the deprivations of liberty,
goods and services, heterosexual relationships, autonomy, and security. Id. at 65-88. Solidar-
ity amongst inmates was exemplified by an inmate code comprising the following tenets:
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provisions encourage solidarity among inmates, including
condemnation of the "snitch," who is "hated [and] despised,"44 and
subject to brutal treatment when unmasked.5 While the code
identified by Sykes has evolved,46 the adversarial relationship
between inmates and prison staff remains in place: "Prisoners
[still] intensely dislike their overseers.
'
,
7
The inmate code's counterpart arises from the correctional offi-
cer subculture.4' An informal code largely defines the content of
this subculture.4 "9 The tenets of the correctional officer code in-
clude "don't rat," "never make an officer look bad in front of an
1) "Don't interfere with inmate interests"; 2) "Don't lose your head"; 3) "Don't exploit other
inmates"; 4) "Don't weaken [Be tough]"; and 5) "Don't be a sucker [treat guards with con-
stant suspicion]." Gresham M. Sykes & Sheldon L. Messinger, Inmate Social System, in 3 CRIME
ANDJUSTICE 77, 77-78 (Leon Radzinowicz & Marvin E. Wolfgang eds., 1971).
Sykes' thesis found support as well as criticism. Compare, e.g., Ronald L. Akers et al., Homo-
sexual and Drug Behavior in Prison: A Test of the Functional and Importation Models of the Inmate
System, 21 Soc. PROBLEMS 410, 415-16 (1974) (concluding that the degree of prisonization is
correlated with punitive prison conditions); Bernard B. Berk, Organizational Goals and Inmate
Organization, 71 AM.J. SOCIOLOGY 522, 534 (1966) (concluding that prisonization increased
in custodial prisons), with John Irwin & Donald R. Cressey, Thieves, Convicts and the Inmate
Culture, 10 Soc. PROBLEMS 142, 142-55 (1962) (asserting that the pre-prison experiences of
inmates influenced their behavior once incarcerated).
44. See Raymond G. Kessler & Julian B. Roebuck, Snitch, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERI-
CAN PRISONS 449, 449 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank D. Williams III eds., 1996) (explaining
that snitches are "hated and despised ... and may be the object of violent reprisal"); see also,
e.g., Comstrock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 699 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Being labeled a 'snitch'
was dreaded, because it could make the inmate a target for other prisoners' attacks."); Al-
berti v. Heard, 600 F. Supp. 443, 450 (S.D. Tex. 1984) ("[I]t is apparent that the inmates
have an unwritten code of silence which results in most acts of violence going undetected.").
45. See, e.g., Benefield v. McDowall, 241 E3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (observing
that a correctional officer "was aware of the obvious danger associated with a reputation as a
snitch"); Reece v. Groose, 60 F.3d 487, 488 (8th Cir. 1995) (being known as a snitch placed
one "at a substantial risk of injury at [other inmates'] hands"); Valandingham v. Bojorquez,
866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989) (ruling that a correctional officer describing inmates
as a "'snitch' in the presence of other inmates is 'material' to a section 1983 claim for denial
of the right not to be subjected to physical harm by employees of the state acting under
color of law").
46. See, e.g., JOYCELYN M. POLLOCK, PRISONS AND PRISON LIFE 103 (2004) (observing
that the contemporary prison is very different from that described by Sykes, but Pollock
does not take issue with the adversarial relationship between prison and staff that is widely
accepted today).
47. IRWIN, supra note 38, at 66.
48. KELSEY KAUFFMAN, PRISON OFFICERS AND THEIR WORLD 85 (1988) (observing that
correctional officers "possess a distinct subculture," with "[t]heir own beliefs and code of
conduct").
49. That Guards inflict severe informal sanctions on officers who violate the code
speaks to its importance among correctional officers. For instance, in Fairley v. Fermaint, 482
F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2007), two guards at Chicago's Cook CountyJail brought a civil rights suits
alleging the following: "The defendants and their confederates bully and ostracize any guard
who plays by the rules; these strong-arm tactics organize and protect guards who beat in-
mates at whim and then lie about their activities to their superiors, criminal investigators,
and judges in any suits that the prisoners may file." Id. at 899.
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inmate," "support officer sanctions against inmates," do not show
"sympathy for or identification with inmates," and "maintain offi-
cer solidarity., 51 One commentator observed these norms "function
to deny equal respect to inmates, the moral keystone of prisoners'
rights.,
5
1
C. Constitutional Taxonomy
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has provided a func-
tional typology of retaliation claims. A general claim of retaliation,
in which the retaliation is itself unconstitutional, comprises the
first category.52 This Article principally examines the second cate-
gory-breaches of enumerated constitutional rights, most of which
implicate the First Amendment.
5
1
In Thaddeus-X v. Blatter,54 the Sixth Circuit attributed this two-tier
classification of retaliation claims to the Supreme Court's decision
in Graham v. Connor.5 According to the Sixth Circuit, the Court in
Graham distinguished infringements of rights having "explicit tex-
tual source[s]" from constitutional violations that are lumped
under substantive due process, holding that the latter should be
subjected to the "open-ended," "shock the conscience" substantive
due process test, whereas the former would be governed by
amendment-specific tests.56
50. KAUFFMAN, supra note 48, at 85-114.
51. James E. Robertson, A Saving Construction: How to Read the Physical Injury Rule of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 29 (2001).
52. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing retaliation as a per se vio-
lation the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
53. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text (discussing the role of retaliation in
inflicting violations of the First Amendment).
54. 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999).
55. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
56. Id. at 387. Nonetheless, not until Thaddeus-X did the Sixth Circuit employ this dis-
tinction, choosing instead to use the conscience shocking test even though the retaliation
claims alleged violations of enumerated rights. As to the concept of substantive due process,
in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), police pumped the stomach of a suspected drug
dealer, leading the Court to find:
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the
petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible
extraction of his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding by agents of govern-
ment to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are
methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentia-
tion.
Id. at 172.
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1. General Claims of Retaliation
General claims of retaliation, in which the retaliation in and by
itself violates the Due Process Clause, are rare and the most chal-
lenging for plaintiffs. As one court explained:
In the great majority of cases, inmates are unable to survive
summary judgment under this demanding standard. The rare
exceptions have been in cases where, for example, a prison of-
ficial issued death threats against an inmate while holding a
cocked pistol at his head, or where prison officials trumped
up false disciplinary charges against an inmate and then pro-
ceeded to physically abuse him and levy harsh disciplinary
sanctions against him.57
This daunting standard conforms to the Supreme Court's
proposition that "only the most egregious official conduct" consti-
tutes "conscience shocking" behavior. Yet conscience shocking
represents a vague standard which "precludes defining."
59
2. First Amendment Retaliation
In Hoskins v. Lenear,60 an inmate filed a grievance when a correc-
tional officer directed a racial epithet at him.6' His grievance soon
led to two fabricated disciplinary charges, subsequent convictions,
and severe penalties. 2 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit in Hoskins
held that the fabrication of disciplinary charges did not deprive
him of a liberty interest and thus did not implicate his right to due
process of law.63 On the other hand, the Hoskins court also held
that retaliation born of an inmate's "constitutionally protected ac-
tivity" via the First Amendment-in this instance, using "grievance
procedures without threat of recrimination"-stated a claim.
6 4
The overwhelming majority of retaliation actions brought under
§ 1983 assert violation of the grievant-inmate's First Amendment
57. Scott v. Freeburn, No. 06-13313, 2007 WL 1140719, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 17,
2007).
58. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
59. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173.
60. 395 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2005).
61. Id. at 373.
62. Id. at 373-74.
63. Id. at 375.
64. Id.
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rights. 65 In Bennett v. Hendrix,6 6 the Eleventh Circuit spoke for many
of its sister circuits in explaining that "[t] he gist of a retaliation
claim is that a prisoner is penalized for exercising the right of free
speech. 67
II. THE ELEMENTS OF PRIMA FACIE RETALIATION
A substantial body of case law describes three core elements of a
prima facie case of retaliation. "To prevail on a retaliation claim,"
explained one court, "a prisoner [must] show that: (1) he engaged
in protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse action; and
(3) the adverse action was causally related to the protected expres-
sion. 68 The Article examines each component below.
A. A Protected First Amendment Activity
"Of fundamental import to prisoners," wrote the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, "are their First Amendment rights to
65. See, e.g., Powers v. Synder, 484 F.3d 929, 933 (7th Cir. 2007); Siggers-El v. Barlow,
412 F.3d 693, 701 (6th Cir. 2005); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F3d. 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005);
Freeman v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 369 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2004); Scott v. Coughlin,
344 F.3d 282, 288 (2d Cir. 2003); Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2003);
Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 2002); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th
Cir. 2000); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997); Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d
813, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Babcock v. White, 102 E3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996); Franco v.
Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589 (2d Cir. 1988); Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373-74 (3d Cir.
1981); Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811, 816 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Hunter v. Heath, 95
F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1149 (D. Or. 2000).
66. 423 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2005).
67. Id. at 1253 n.6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
68. Hicks v. Ferrero, 241 F. App'x 595, 597 (11th Cir. 2007). As to the similarities be-
tween several circuits, the Fifth Circuit in Freeman, 369 F.3d 854, set forth the following test:
"(1) the existence of a specific constitutional right; (2) the defendant's intent to retaliate for
the exercise of that right; (3) a retaliatory adverse act; and (4) causation." Id. at 863. The
Second Circuit in Scott, 344 F.3d at 288, advanced a similar test but divided it into three
parts: "(1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took
adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the
protected speech and the adverse action." Id. at 287 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). A five-part test appeared in Rhodes, 408 F.3d. 559: "(1) [a]n assertion that a state
actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's pro-
tected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First
Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional
goal." Id. at 567 (footnote omitted).
The inmate has a heavy evidentiary burden to establish a prima facie case. See, e.g.,
Murphy v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 769 F.2d 502, 503 n.1 (8th Cir. 1985). Merely alleging that an
act was retaliatory is insufficient. See, e.g., Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 1985).
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file prison grievances and to pursue civil litigation in the courts. 69
In turn, well-established law provides that grievance-motivated re-
taliation violates the First Amendment.
70
1. Variations of a Common Theme
Access to the courts is among the oldest of prisoners' rights. Its
lineage begins with the Supreme Court's 1941 decision in Ex parte
Hull 7O The facts of Hull tell of prison officials requiring habeas cor-
pus petitions to come before an "institutional [prison] review
board" to ensure that "they are properly drawn"7-a made-to-order
scenario for identifying jailhouse lawyers73 and subsequently retali-
69. Rhodes, 480 F.3d at 567 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But see
Herron v. Harrison, 203 E3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000) ("This right is protected, however,
only if the grievances are not frivolous.").
70. Defendants have commonly asserted qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is
one of the fair warning defenses. As opposed to the void for vagueness doctrine, which
guards against statutes that fail to give fair warning, this defense speaks to civil rights actions
against public officials. It is also a defense from suit, and must be advanced and proven at
the outset of the action. In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court deline-
ated a two-step test, each of which is "separate and distinct":
A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider this thresh-
old question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do
the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? This must
be the initial inquiry... If no constitutional right would have been violated were the
allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning quali-
fied immunity. On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable
view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right
was clearly established.
Id. at 201.
Assuming that the plaintiff can aver facts that satisfy the first part of the test and thus
show that his or her case is not frivolous, a defendant's claim of qualified immunity should
fail because, courts have long rejected defendants' assertions that the right is not clearly
established. See, e.g., Atkinson, 316 F.3d at 269-70 (indicating that as early as 1981, in Mil-
house, 652 E2d at 373-74, the circuit held that alleging retaliation for filing a civil rights suit
"stated a cause of action for infringement of the prisoner's First Amendment right"); see also,
e.g., Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567 ("Of fundamental import to prisoners are their First Amend-
ment 'right[s] to file prison grievances' .... " (quoting Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288
(9th Cir. 2003) (footnote omitted)).
71. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
72. Id. at 548-49.
73. SeeJulie B. Nobel, Ensuring MeaningfulJailhouse Legal Assistance: The Need for a Jail-
house Lauyer-Inmate Privilege, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1569 (1997).
There is no clear definition of ajailhouse lawyer, but several characteristics are essen-
tial to any definition: all jailhouse lawyers are incarcerated; most do not have a law
degree or any formal legal training; and all claim to possess some legal knowledge
and are sought out by other prisoners for this reason. Some jailhouse lawyers serve as
law clerks or legal assistants in prison libraries; others work as freelancers and provide
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ating against them. The Court, however, would not address the mo-
tives of the Michigan prison officials. Its terse opinion stated in
relevant part that
the state and its officers may not abridge or impair peti-
tioner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus. Whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus ad-
dressed to a federal court is properly drawn and what
allegations it must contain are questions for that court alone
to determine. 4
Inmates did not realize a meaningful right of access to courts
until 1969, when the Court in Johnson v. Avery1 5 held thatjailhouse
76lawyers enjoy constitutional protection. In Bounds v. Smith," the
Court upped the ante by imposing upon states "affirmative obliga-
tions to assure all prisoners meaningful access to the courts
78
through the availability of an "adequate" law library79 or "alterna-
tive sources of legal knowledge"80 such as the access to volunteer
attorneys or paraprofessionals.8 ' More recently, however, in Lewis v.
Casey,82 the Court partly closed the courthouse door by requiring
an "actual injury" in claiming a deprivation of this right.
8 3
Meanwhile, lower federal courts have held that retaliation can
implicate two other First Amendment rights. The Fifth Circuit in
Freeman v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice 4 characterized retalia-
tion as a violation of the First Amendment right to criticize prison
officials. 8 Although the court failed to identify the rationale for
services that are completely independent of their penal institution. Although jail-
house lawyers are not supposed to be paid for their services, it is well-documented
that most of them are compensated by money or other goods or favors.
Id. at 1573-75 (footnotes omitted).
Jailhouse lawyers received constitutional protection in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969), which ruled that inmates can aid one another in seeking access to the courts in the
absence of alternative means of legal assistance. See id. at 490.
74. Hull, 312 U.S. at 549.
75. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
76. See id. at 490.
77. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
78. Id. at 824.
79. Id. at 828.
80. Id. at 817.
81. Id. at 830-31.
82. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
83. Id. at 349.
84. 369 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2004).
85. See id. at 864.
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this right, one need look no further than the landmark ruling in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan6:
[F]reedom to discuss public affairs and public officials is un-
questionably, as the Court today holds, the kind of speech the
First Amendment was primarily designed to keep within the
area of free discussion. To punish the exercise of this right to
discuss public affairs ... is to abridge or shut off discussion of
the very kind most needed .
Lastly, several lower federal courts have deemed retaliation an
abridgment of the First Amendment right to petition for redress of
grievances.8 s Long considered "among the most precious of the
liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights,"8 9 it stands as one of the
earliest rights extended to inmates. "[P] ersons in prison, like other
individuals," explained the Supreme Court in its 1972 decision in
Cruz v. Beto,90 "have the right to petition the Government for re-
dress of grievances which, of course, includes access of prisoners to
the courts....
2. Caveats
a. The Turner Test
Prison officials can police prison speech. The Supreme Court's
landmark ruling Turner v. Safley92 granted wide latitude to prison
86. 376 U.S. 254, 296 (1964) (Black,J, concurring).
87. Id. at 296-97.
88. See, e.g., Powers v. Synder, 484 F.3d 929, 933 (7th Cir. 2007); Scott v. Coughlin, 344
E3d 282, 288 (2d Cir. 2003); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000); Franco v. Kelly,
854 E2d 584,589 (2d Cir. 1988); Hunter v. Heath, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1149 (D. Or. 2000).
89. United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
90. 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).
91. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
92. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). By contrast, the speech of free people enjoys a "fundamental"
or "preferred" status. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (ruling that free speech
constitutes a fundamental right). Laws limiting such rights are subject to "strict scrutiny,"
whereby the government must demonstrate that the impediment advances a compelling
state interest in a narrowly tailored manner. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. New York Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980) (ruling that the ight to receive mail is fundamental
and restrictions upon it are subject to "strict scrutiny"). In 1972 Professor Gerald Gunther
famously asserted that strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1,8 (1972). But seeAdarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'") (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring)).
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officials in censoring prison speech. It did so by mandating the
least rigorous degree of scrutiny-whether the censorship in ques-
tion "is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."9 3 To
determine reasonableness, the court advanced a four-pronged test:
(1) whether the regulation limiting free speech rationally advances
the governmental interest in rehabilitating offenders or safeguard-
ing the public, staff, and inmates; (2) the availability of an
alternative means of exercising freedom of speech; (3) the impact
of accommodating the asserted right; and (4) the absence of a
ready alternative to the challenged regulation. 4
The ruling in Freeman v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice95 illus-
trates the tenuous state of free speech under the Turner test. Prison
staff allegedly retaliated against the plaintiff because of his public
criticism of a prison chaplain for his "depart[ure] from the faith."96
Authorities had allowed the plaintiff to read his criticisms of the
chaplain during a church service, but his presentation ended pre-
maturely when the chaplain in question ordered him to stop, which
he did. 97 After officials escorted Freeman from the place of worship,
some fifty inmates prematurely left in protest.98 Prison staff then
charged and convicted him of a disciplinary violation and trans-
ferred him to a more restrictive living unit.99 While acknowledging
inmates' "general right" to criticize prison officials, the court held
that it must be exercised "in a manner consistent with [their] status
as [prisoners].'0 The court concluded that the plaintiff had crossed
the line, as evidenced by the walkout he inspired.10'
b. The Public Importance Test
Does the content of speech determine whether the speaker can
be subjected to retaliation by a government institution? In Pickering
v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will County°2
and Connick v. Myers1°3 the Court answered affirmatively. Both cases
addressed retaliatory actions taken against public employees. In
93. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
94. See id. at 92-93.
95. 369 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2004).
96. Id. at 858.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 864.
101. Id.
102. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
103. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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Pickering, the Court held that the speech in question would not en-
joy the Constitution's protection unless it addressed matters of
"public concern" and, on balance, that the employee's right to free
expression outweighed the proper functioning of the employing
governmental agency. 10 4 Later, the Connick Court ruled that the
"content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by
the whole record," addressed matters of "public concern" as op-
posed to "personal interest."'05
Recently, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,10 6 the Supreme Court departed
from precedent and diminished First Amendment protection for
speech of public importance. The Court advanced a two-part test
for determining when employee speech receives First Amendment
protection from employer discipline. The first part requires the
speech in question to address a "matter of public concern."'0 7 The
second part stipulates that public employees must speak as citizens
and thus outside their official capacity as public employees. '08 In
Garcetti, the Court concluded that a deputy district attorney acted
"pursuant" to his official "duties as a calendar deputy"-as
juxtaposed to speaking as a "citizen" for First Amendment
purposes-when writing a disposition memorandum.'9 What the
attorney had characterized as "retaliation" thus became
constitutionally permissible "employer discipline."" °
Only the Seventh Circuit has expressly limited retaliation claims
to matters of public importance. In McElroy v. Lopac"' the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant correctional officers removed him from
his prison job in retaliation for inquiring whether he and his fellow
sewing shop workers would receive "lay-in pay"-a form of unem-
ployment compensation-upon the closing of the prison's sewing
shop." 2 The court concluded that it did not need to address
whether retaliation occurred because the speech in question, in
this instance the query about "lay-in pay," lacked public importance
or concern."3 Without further explanation, the court characterized
this matter as a "personal" one and thus lacking constitutional pro-
tection." 4 One member of the three-judge panel dissented, arguing
104. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
105. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
106. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
107. Id. at 418.
108. See id. at 421-22.
109. Id. at 421.
110. Id.
111. 403 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2005).
112. Seeid. at857.
113. Seeid. at858.
114. Id.
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that the question of "lay-in pay" impacted "a group of prisoners"
and thus constituted a public concern, rendering it a proper sub-
ject for First Amendment protection.1 5
Later, in Pearson v. Welborn'16 an inmate argued that the defen-
dant prison employee had filed a trumped-up charge of
"masturbation"-a violation of prison rules-because the plaintiff
had refused to become an informant and had complained about a
lack of outdoor exercise as well as the practice of shackling inmates
during their group therapy.17 The defendant officer contended
that the plaintiff's complaints were "personal gripes about unim-
portant matters.""8 The court disagreed, characterizing them as of
public importance because they related to prison policy and ad-
dressed the treatment of a group of prisoners." 9 The Seventh
Circuit chose not to address whether the plaintiffs refusal to act as
an informant per se met the public importance test.12
c. An Actual Injury
Most courts posit that a retaliation claim brought under § 1983
must show "actual injury."' 2 ' Their rationale rests on the nature of
§ 1983 actions. Starting with Monroe v. Pape,2 2 the Supreme Court
has read § 1983 "against the background of tort liability"2 3 as justi-
fication for barring recovery for the presumed or abstract value of
substantive constitutional rights2 4 or the inherent value of proce-
dural constitutional rights. 25 Consequently, tort-based restrictions
apply, the most significant of which requires an "actual injury," as
opposed to a de minimis injury such as being "squeezed."2 6
115. See id. at 859 (Fairchild, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
116. 471 E3d 732 (7th Cir. 2006).
117. See id. at 736-37.
118. Id. at 740.
119. See id. at 741.
120. See id. at 740.
121. See, e.g., Siggers-E1 v. Barlow, 412 E3d 693, 701 (6th Cir. 2005); Ali v. Szabo, 81 F.
Supp. 2d 447,467 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
122. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
123. Id. at 187.
124. Memphis Comty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 311-13 (1986).
125. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-65 (1978).
126. Ali, 81 E Supp. 2d at 467, n.1 1.
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B. An Adverse Action
"Adversity," a term taken from employment case law,12 7 provides
the second element in a grievance-motivated retaliation claim. The
attributes of a hardship of this magnitude remain unclear, but sev-
eral unifying themes emerge from the case law.
First, the requisite degree of adversity does not necessarily entail
the violation of statutory or constitutional rights.'28 For instance, in
Hoskins v. Lenea1 29 the adversity consisted of a disciplinary punish-
ment leading to the segregation of the plaintiff and his transfer to
another prison. 30 Inmate Hoskins contended that the defendant
had framed him after he filed a grievance. 13 ' The grievance stated
that the defendant, a civilian food service supervisor, had called
Hoskins a racial epithet when he could not locate cartons of choco-
late milk. 132 Three days later the defendant charged Hoskins with
"insolence," a disciplinary violation.'33 According to the plaintiff, a
fellow inmate had told of overhearing a shift supervisor encourage
the defendant officer to "ticket" the plaintiff so that "he could take
care of Hoskins."'3 ' The defendant did just that. A disciplinary tri-
bunal pronounced the plaintiff guilty and as punishment stripped
him of his desirable job in the prison cafeteria. 33 Shortly thereafter,
a prison captain allegedly told him that the disciplinary charge
would "go away" if he dropped his grievance. 36 The inmate failed
to take this advice, and his keepers soon charged Hoskins with a
second offense, making "possible verbal threats towards staff."' 37 A
hearing officer pronounced him guilty and imposed two months of
solitary confinement and transfer to another prison as his punish-
ment.38 While none of these hardships arguably deprived this
inmate of the liberty protected by procedural due process, the
court held that " [c] onduct that does not independently violate the
127. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 396 (6th Cir. 1999).
128. See, e.g., Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2005); Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389
F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir. 2004); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996); Pratt v.
Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806-07 (9th Cir. 1995); Sisney v. Reisch, 533 F. Supp. 2d 952, 993
(D.S.D. 2008); Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99, 105 n.18 (D. Mass.
2001).
129. 395 F.3d 372.
130. See id. at 374.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 373.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 373-74.
135. See id. at 374.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id.
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Constitution can form the basis for a retaliation claim, if that con-
duct is done with an improper, retaliatory motive."'3 9
The second theme posits a widely used test for determining
which hardships are constitutionally cognizable. For instance, in
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter[4° the Sixth Circuit concluded that reprisals
resulting in transfer to administrative segregation 4' would be "ad-
verse" and lesser retaliatory acts would reach this threshold should
they "'deter a[n] [objective] person of ordinary firmness' from the
exercise of the right at stake."'42 The court attributed its test to
Judge Posner's opinion in Bart v. Telford,'43 which addressed work-
place harassment. Judge Posner observed: "[i] t would trivialize the
First Amendment to hold that harassment for exercising the right
of free speech was always actionable no matter how unlikely to de-
ter a person of ordinary firmness from that exercise.... "'44 Judge
Posner's test does not require an actual or putative chilling of
speech,just the objective capacity to do so."4
The following cases chart the often vague boundaries of Posner's
standard. The unpublished opinion in Jackson v. Madery46 illus-
trates an adverse action that fails this test. The plaintiff complained
of a "conspiracy" by the defendants in response to his filing griev-
ances and bringing a legal action alleging racism on their part.
47
This alleged "conspiracy" led to his reclassification to "modified
access status," which dictated that he submit his grievance petitions
to an officer charged with screening out frivolous complaints. 4
The court held that this adversity would not deter "an ordinary
139. Id. at 375.
140. 175 E3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999).
141. "The term 'administrative segregation' is frequently used to describe all nonpuni-
tive forms of segregation, including protective custody." James E. Robertson, The Constitution
in Protective Custody: An Analysis of the Rights of Protective Custody Inmates, 56 U. CIN. L. Rv. 91,
91 n.2 (1987).
142. Thaddeus-X, 175 E3d at 396 (quoting Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir.
1982)); see also Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2005) (observing that all
circuits except the Second Circuit embrace an objective test); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F3d.
559, 569 (9th Cir. 2005) (ruling that no actual inhibition of speech must be shown because
"it would be unjust to allow a defendant to escape liability for a First Amendment violation
merely because an unusually determined plaintiff persists in his protected activity") (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted); Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 E3d 379, 383 (2d Cir.
2004) (calling for an objective standard in that "it would be unfair in the extreme to rule
that plaintiffs bringing of the subsequent claim in itself defeated his claim of retaliation").
143. 677 F.2d 622.
144. Id. at 625; see also Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 398 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[T]his
threshold is intended to weed out only inconsequential actions, and is not a means whereby
solely egregious retaliatory acts are allowed to proceed past summaryjudgment.").
145. See Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 E3d 379, 382 (2d Cir. 2004).
146. 158 F. App'x 656 (6th Cir. 2005).
147. Id. at 658.
148. Id.
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person of reasonable firmness" from either filing grievances or
bringing a lawsuit.
1 4
1
The Sixth Circuit in Brown v. Crowley150 applied the same test to
the plaintiff's confinement in punitive segregation.1 5 1 According to
the plaintiff, defendant prison staff fabricated a major misconduct
charge and as punishment moved him to punitive segregation. Al-
though his prior confinement in administrative segregation
imposed many of the hardships found in punitive segregation,52
the court held that his reclassification would "deter a person of or-
dinary firmness" from engaging in constitutionally protected
activity. 53 The court pointed to a hardship uniquely imposed upon
inmates in punitive segregation-the inability to accumulate "good
time," resulting in a longer prison sentence.
For the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Crawford-El v.
Britton,55 Judge Posner's "ordinary firmness" test represented a
"sensible standard" for determining cognizable First Amendment
injuries inflicted upon inmates. 15 Inmate Crawford-El had com-
plained of prison practices to the Washington Post and then brought
a civil rights action, leading the defendant prison officer to paint
him as "too big for his britches."'57 Crawford-El later claimed that
the defendant retaliated against him by "misdeliver[ing]" his per-
sonal property during the course of his transfer to other prison
5 8
The court addressed whether the plaintiffs "pecuniary losses.., in
the form of the costs of shipping his boxes and replacing clothing"
would deter an inmate of ordinary firmness from exercising pro-
tected speech.' 5 "[T]hough small," wrote the circuit panel, "[these
losses] might well deter a person of ordinary firmness in Crawford-
El's position from speaking again. We agree that the acts asserted
pass that test."' 60
149. Id. at 660.
150. 312 F.3d 782 (6th Cir. 2002).
151. Id. at 789.
152. Brown, 312 F.3d at 789.
153. See id.
154. See id. "Good time" represents "[ciredit based early release from prison or jail."
David Weisburd & Ellen F. Chayet, Good Time Credit, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS
220, 220 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds., 1996). Typically, inmates forfeit
ability to earn good time upon placement in punitive segregation as a punishment for violat-
ing a prison rule.
155. 93 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
156. Id. at 818.
157. Id. at 826.
158. Id. at 815.
159. Id. at 826.
160. Id. Subsequently, the same court held that an allegedly retaliatory prison transfer
met this standard given that the plaintiffs reclassification barred him from working as a tutor
and distanced him from his ill parents and prospective witnesses who would speak on his
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Only one court has explicitly addressed the vexing issue of
whether Judge Posner's "ordinary firmness" test has two distinct
branches: one for civilians and one for inmates. In Siggers-El v. Bar-
low,16 1 the Sixth Circuit answered in the affirmative but without
elaboration: "prisoners are expected to endure more than the av-
erage citizen" before they experience cognizable First Amendment
injuries arising from retaliation. 162 The circuit panel did indicate
that "routine" hardships, such as transferring inmates from one
prison to another, would not deter a prisoner of ordinary firmness
from engaging in constitutionally protected activities. 63 In this in-
stance, however, the foreseeable consequences of the retaliatory
transfer-"[Siggers-El] lost his high paying job ... that he needed
to pay his attorney... [and] the transfer made it more difficult for
his attorney to visit and represent him"'6-led the court to con-
clude that the plaintiff had experienced actionable hardships 65
Earlier, in Bell v. Johnson,6 6 the Sixth Circuit held that the
prevailing "ordinary firmness" test bars recovery for "only
inconsequential" adverse actions. 167 The plaintiff in Bell alleged two
retaliatory "shakedowns" of his cell and the accompanying seizure
of his medical diet snacks and legal papers following his filing of a
civil rights lawsuit.' 6 In finding that the plaintiff's allegations met
the evidentiary burden, the court held that adverse action must be
merely "more than a de minimis injury."'69
Lastly, some circuits have held that deterring free speech is itself
a cognizable injury and is thus actionable as a constitutional tort.
As the Seventh Circuit observed in Power v. Summers,'7" a § 1983
cause of action does not require an "adverse employment action"
behalf at a future parole hearing. See Toolashprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 585
(D.C. Cir. 2002). Surprisingly, the Second Circuit in Morales v. Mackalm, 278 E3d 126 (2d Cir.
2002), held that calling an inmate a informant in front of other inmates was not sufficiently
adverse. See id. at 131. The court also indicated that transferring an inmate to a psychiatric
hospital was sufficiently adverse. See id. at 132; see also Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 353 (2d
Cir. 2003) ("Insulting or disrespectful comments ... generally do not rise to this level."). On
the other hand, destroying legal papers makes the grade. See Green v. Johnson, 977 F.2d
1383, 1389-91 (10th Cir. 1992). So does the confiscation of tennis shoes. See Hall v. Sutton,
755 F.2d 786, 787-88 (11th Cir. 1985). Ditto for denying access to the prison law library. See
Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2000).
161. 412 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2005).
162. Id. at 701.
163. See id. at 701-02.
164. Id. at 702.
165. See id.
166. 308 E3d 594 (6th Cir. 2002).
167. Id. at 606.
168. Id. at 602.
169. Id. at 606.
170. 226 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
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within the meaning of the antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 Rather, "[a] ny deprivation...
that is likely to deter the exercise of free speech ... is action-
able."172 The Seventh Circuit applied this approach to prisoners in
Babcock v. White.1" The court held that placement in administrative
segregation did not deprive the plaintiff of a protected liberty in-
terest, but that it did constitute an adverse action. 174 The court
explained that "the crux of his claim is that state officials violated
his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for his pro-
tected speech activities. 1 75  The Ninth Circuit has explicitly
embraced this view, ruling that "a retaliation claim may assert an
injury no more tangible than a chilling effect on First Amendment
rights."176 The Eleventh Circuit has ruled similarly.
77
C. Motivation/Causation
An adverse action must be "motivated or substantially caused by"
the inmate's exercise of a protected expression. 17 The defendant's
own admission of a retaliatory motive constitutes the most compel-
ling evidence.179 Because such direct evidence is hard to come by,
circumstantial evidence can sometimes establish a retaliatory mo-
tive. As the District of Columbia Circuit wrote, "the distinction
between direct and circumstantial evidence has no direct correla-
tion with the strength of the plaintiffs case." 80 In Hines v. Gomez,""
for example, the plaintiff argued that the defendant correctional
officer framed him for a disciplinary violation in retaliation for his
171. Id. at 820.
172. Id.
173. 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996).
174. See id. at 274.
175. Id. at 275.
176. Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001). In Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d
802 (9th Cir. 1995), a prisoner complained of being double-celled after a long stretch of
being single-celled, and claimed that prison officials made the change to retaliate for his
agreement to participate in a television interview. This court noted that the prisoner had no
constitutionally protected liberty interest in being held in a given facility. Id. at 806-07. Pratt
then concluded that "it would be illegal for [prison] officials to transfer and double-cell
Pratt solely in retaliation for his exercise of protected First Amendment rights." Id. at 807.
177. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) ("A prisoner can establish
retaliation by demonstrating that the prison official's actions were 'the result of his having
filed a grievance concerning the conditions of his imprisonment.'" (quoting Wildberger v.
Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1989))).
178. Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 E3d 379, 381 (2d Cir. 2004).
179. Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that one of the defen-
dants allegedly informed the plaintiff of a retaliatory conspiracy against him).
180. Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813,818 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
181. 108 F.3d 265 (9th Cir. 1997).
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filing a grievance. 8 2 A federal jury agreed. On appeal, the defen-
dant responded that the plaintiff failed to produce any direct
evidence that he knew of the grievance in question.8 3 The court of
appeals upheld the jury's verdict for the plaintiff upon finding "the
inference that... [the defendant] knew, at least to some extent, of
Hines' use of the grievance system." 18 4 According to the circuit
panel, the defendant, as well as other correctional officers, knew of
the plaintiff's reputation for filing "many" grievances-which had
earned him the reputation for "whining."
8
5
"Temporal proximity" between an inmate's exercise of a
protected right and an adverse change in his or her conditions of
confinement provides circumstantial, yet sufficient evidence of a
retaliatory motive. s6 Take the facts of Bennett v. Goord18 7 The court
found that prison officials initiated inmate Bennett's transfer to
New York's infamous, high security prison at Attica during the final
stages of his securing a favorable settlement of a civil rights action
against them. 8  Moreover, the uncontested facts showed that
prison officials brought disciplinary charges after he successfully
thwarted the transfer through administrative remedies." 9
Upholding these charges, the state department of corrections
transferred him to Attica.9 At Attica, inmate Bennett successfully
grieved the disciplinary charges but obtained no meaningful relief
in that the defendant officers continued to confine him at Attica
and later at one of its satellite prisons. 9 He then brought suit for
retaliation, sustained the defendants' successful motion for
182. See id. at 267.
183. Seeid. at 268.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 971 (7th Cir. 2006); Muhammad v. Close,
379 F.3d 413, 417-18 (6th Cir. 2004); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 422 (6th Cir. 2004);
Bennett v. Goord, 343 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2003);Jackson v. Madery, 158 F. App'x 656, 661
(6th Cir. 2005); Rodriguez v. McClenning, 399 F. Supp. 2d 228, 236 n.71 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Some courts require a "chronology of events" but the key consideration remains temporal
proximity. See Marshall 445 F.3d at 971 (stating that "a complaint need only allege a chro-
nology of events from which retaliation may be inferred") (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The inmate must
produce direct evidence of motivating or, the more probable scenario, allege a chronology
of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.") (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). But see McElroy v. Lopac, 403 F.3d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Our recent
cases have rejected any requirement that an inmate allege a chronology of events in order to
state a claim of retaliation because such a requirement is contrary to the federal rule of
notice pleading.").
187. 343 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2003).
188. See id. at 135.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 135-36.
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summary judgment,192 but ultimately prevailed before the Second
Circuit. 93 While acknowledging the lack of direct evidence linking
this inmate's earlier, successful civil suit against his keepers to a
series of alleged retaliatory disciplinary charges and the improper
transfer, the court concluded that the "temporal proximity"
between them constituted "[sufficiently compelling] circumstantial
evidence of retaliation.' ' 9
The plaintiff's prior commendable conduct can also inferentially
establish a retaliatory motive. Take Colon v. Coughlin,195 where the
plaintiff had filed two previous lawsuits against his captors. He
claimed that the defendants had retaliated by falsely charging him
with two disciplinary infractions when a search of his cell purport-
edly yielded a knife and marijuana. 96 Despite his claims of
innocence and his previous record of good conduct, a hearing of-
ficer sentenced him to 360 days in solitary confinement.' 97 In
holding that his retaliation claim survived a motion for a summary
judgment, the court observed that "Colon alleges ... that he had
never previously been found in possession of either drugs or weap-
ons while in prison, and we have determined that evidence of prior
good behavior also may be circumstantial evidence of retalia-
tion. ' ' l 8
What if the hardship experienced by the plaintiff would have
arisen regardless of his keeper's retaliatory motive? The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Scott v. Coughlin'9 addressed this
issue:
Regardless of the presence of retaliatory motive, however, a
defendant may be entitled to summary judgment if he can
show dual motivation, i.e., that even without the improper
motivation the alleged retaliatory action would have occurred.
Plaintiff has the initial burden of showing that an improper
motive played a substantial part in defendant's action. The
burden then shifts to defendant to show it would have taken
200
exactly the same action absent the improper motive.
192. See id. at 136-37.
193. See id. at 139.
194. Id. at 138.
195. 58 E3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).
196. See id. at 867-68.
197. Id. at 868.
198. Id. at 872.
199. 344 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2003).
200. Id. at 287-88 (citation omitted).
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The Scott plaintiff's difficulties began after he attested to seeing
guards assault a fellow inmate.2 0 ' Two correctional officers, one of
whom he implicated in the assault, independently brought disci-
plinary charges against him when he allegedly resisted a pat-frisk
search.2  At a hearing to adjudicate the two sets of disciplinary
charges, the plaintiff characterized the incident as a "pretext" for
an officer-led retaliatory assault upon him.03 A hearing officer
found against him after receiving disciplinary reports from the two
officers.0 4 The plaintiff's suit alleged in relevant part that the re-
sulting disciplinary sanctions arose from a retaliatory motive.2 0 5 For
the Second Circuit, the outcome depended on whether there ex-
isted a proper motive alongside an improper one for the
disciplinary sanctions imposed on the plaintiff.2 0 The Second Cir-
cuit ruled that it could not make this determination and remanded
the case for additional findings of fact.
2 0 7
III. DAMAGES
Are sixty days in solitary confinement-the price the plaintiff in
Royal v. Kautzk s08 paid for asserting his First Amendment rights-
worth no more than the $1 in nominal damages awarded by the
court? Meeting en banc, the Eighth Circuit in Royaljoined the ma-
jority of circuits in concluding that the absence of a physical injury
precludes compensatory damages00 for an inmate alleging uncon-
stitutional retaliation. The court had applied one of the most
noxious provisions of the PLRA, § 1997e(e), which provides that
"[n] o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in
ajail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional
injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury."210 As in the Royal case, retaliation arising from the filing of
grievances, lawsuits, or other protected activities under the First
201. See id. at 284-85.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 285.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 288-89.
206. See id. at 287-88.
207. See id. at 290.
208. 375 F.3d 720, 727 (8th Cir. 2004).
209. See, e.g., Geiger v. Jowers, 404 f3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226
F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000) (addressing First Amendment free exercise of religion claims);
Roya4 375 F.3d at 722-23 (addressing claims of retaliation for exercising First Amendment
Rights); Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 875-76 (10th Cir. 2001) (addressing First
Amendment free exercise of religion claims).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006) (emphasis added).
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Amendment has rarely resulted in physical injury.2 1 And
have held that the routine discomforts of imprisonment fall out-
side the statute's concept of a cognizable physical injury.212
The plaintiff in Royal had filed several grievances concerning al-
legedly inadequate medical care for his spinal cord injury. 21 3
Having "tired" of his grievances, the defendant correctional officer
transferred him to solitary confinement for sixty days.1 4 Conse-
quently, the plaintiff brought a retaliation lawsuit. Because he
failed to allege a physical injury, the Eighth Circuit upheld the trial
court's decision to award no compensatory damages for his lengthy
solitary confinement despite the district court's finding of uncon-
stitutional retaliation.2 '5 Nor did the circuit panel award punitive
damages, explaining in part that the defendant acted not out of
"evil motive or reckless indifference, but out of frustration and a
desire to protect his staff from [the plaintiffs] abuse."2 1 6 Thus, the
sixty days of illegal segregation earned this inmate one dollar in
nominal damages, with his attorney receiving a fee of $1.50, which
represented 150% of the damages awarded. 7
Most courts, with the notable exception of the District of
Columbia Circuit, have concluded that the physical injury re-
quirement set forth in § 1997e(e) does not bar nominal or punitive
damages. Case law suggests that juries will occasionally award sig-
211. See, e.g., Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 E Supp. 2d 811, 816 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Figel v.
Overton, No. 2:03-CV-216, 2006 WL 2521600, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 30, 2006); Proby v.
Harris, No. 5:05CV00126, 2006 WL 794887, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 24, 2006); Percival v. Row-
ley, No. 1:02-CV-363, 2005 WL 2572034, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2005).
212. Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999); see also, e.g., Leon v. John-
son, 96 E Supp. 2d 244, 248 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (excluding tardy receipt of medication); Jones
v. Sheahan, No. 99 C 3669, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14130, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2000)
(excluding delayed surgery for a tumor); Cannon v. Burkybile, No. 99 C4623, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14139, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2000) (excluding "headaches, insomnia, stress, and
stomach anxiety"); Davis v. O'Brien, No. 3:99-CV-1885-G, 2000 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 4691, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2000) (excluding a cut wrist); Cloud v. Goldberg, No. 98-4250, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1295, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2000) (excluding "depression, insomnia, and just
being in a scary frame of mind").
213. Royal v. Kautzky, 375 E3d 720 (8th Cir. 2004).
214. Id. at 722.
215. See id. at 722-26.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 725-26. The Act requires the trial court to set aside up to 25% of the dam-
ages for plaintiff's attorney fees, which can never exceed the lesser of the following: 150% of
the monetary award or 150% of the hourly rate of appointed counsel in a federal criminal
prosecution. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (d)(1)-(3) (2006).
218. Compare Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[Sec-
tion] 1997e(e) draws no ... distinction [between compensatory and punitive damage
claims]. It simply prevents suits 'for' mental injury without prior physical injury."), with, e.g.
Allah v. A-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000) (permitting nominal and punitive dam-
ages); Waters v. Andrews, 97-CV-407A(F), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16004, at *23 (W.D.N.Y.
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nificant punitive damages in prison retaliation cases. For instance,
the Sixth Circuit in Bell v. Johnson19 upheld a jury verdict of $28,000
in punitive damages. 2 0 Earlier, in Maurer v. Patterson,1 the jury
awarded $75,000 in punitive damages.222 The largest award may be
that upheld by the District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan in Siggers-El v. Barlow.2 The facts tell of the defendant
transferring the plaintiff to another prison after the inmate twice
complained of the defendant's failure to disburse money from the
plaintiff's account to pay for attorney fees.224 The court upheld the
jury's award to the plaintiff of $4,000 in economic damages,
$15,000 in mental or emotional damages, and $200,000 in punitive
damages.22 ' As to the high ratio of punitive damages to compensa-
tory damages, the court answered that "[i]n constitutional cases
such as this one, where economic damages are typically small, the
Sixth Circuit has condoned punitive damages which greatly exceed
compensatory damages awards."
2 6
However, significant punitive awards like that upheld in Siggers-El
face substantive due process challenges. In BMW of North America,
227Inc. v. Gore, a civil action alleging fraud, the Supreme Court
voided a jury's $4 million punitive damage judgment as constitu-
tionally excessive where the jury assessed compensatory damages at
a mere $4000.22s In 2008, the Court in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker2 9
embraced Gor's multiplier approach in ruling that a punitive award
exceeding a one-to-one ratio to compensatory damages raises consti-
tutional concern.2 ° While the Court expressly limited this ratio to
maritime cases,2 1 Justice Souter's majority opinion observed that
Sept. 15, 2000) (permitting punitive damages); McGrath v.Johnson, 67 F. Supp. 2d 499, 508
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (permitting nominal damages).
219. 404 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2005).
220. See id. at 1002.
221. 197 ER.D. 244 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 4,2000).
222. See id. at 246. The federal district court later reduced the jury award to $20,000. See
id. at 250.
223. 433 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
224. Seeid. at 814-15.
225. See id. at 815.
226. Id. at 818.
227. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
228. See id. at 574-75. The Court set forth three guideposts for determining when puni-
tive awards violated the Constitution: "the degree of reprehensibility of the [defendant's
conduct]; the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by [the plaintiff] and
his punitive damages award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases." Id.
229. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
230. See id. at 598 ("[W]e consider that a 1:1 ratio, which is above the median award, is a
fair upper limit in such maritime cases.").
231. See id.
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"[t] here is better evidence of an accepted limit of reasonable civil
penalty... in several studies ... showing the median ratio of puni-
tive to compensatory verdicts [of less than 1:1]. ... .,,23
On the other hand, a minority line of cases posits that the physi-
cal injury requirement of § 1997e(e) does not apply when the
underlying constitutional right in jeopardy is one possessing intrin-
sic value. These rights include procedural due process,233 equal
protection,2 3 freedom from illegal confinement,235' religious free-
dom, s6 freedom from First Amendment retaliation, and other
First Amendment rights. 2
3 18
The District Court for the.Western District of Michigan has ar-
ticulated a second reason for not applying § 1997e(e) in First
Amendment retaliation cases. In refusing to set aside a jury award
of $15,000 for mental or emotional damages, the district court in
Siggers-El v. Barlow 9 asserted that Congress "did not intend to allow
prison officials to violate inmate First Amendment rights with im-
punity, resolute with the knowledge that First Amendment
violations will almost never result in physical injuries."240
The Supreme Court has yet to address the scope of § 1997e(e).
Its dicta in Memphis Community School District v. Stachur2 ' 1 included
the observation that "the abstract value of a constitutional right
may not form the basis for § 1983 damages., 24 The Court added
that "[o]ur discussion of that issue makes clear that nominal dam-
ages, and not damages based on some indefinable 'value' of
infringed rights, are the appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights
whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury."243 How-
ever, the Stachura Court cautioned that
[w]hen a plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury that is
likely to have occurred but difficult to establish, some form of
232. Id. at 597-98.
233. See Barnes v. Ramos, No. 94 C 7541, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15260, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Oct 11, 1996).
234. See Mason v. Schriro, 45 F. Supp. 2d 709, 720 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
235. SeeFriedland v. Fauver, 6 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310 (D.N.J. 1998).
236. See, e.g., Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998).
237. See Williams v. Ollis, 230 F.3d 1361 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision);
Clarke v. Stalder, 121 E3d 222, 227 n.8 (5th Cir. 1997); Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d
811, 816 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Percival v. Rowley, No. 1:02-CV-363, 2005 WL 2572034, at *3
(W.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2005).
238. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1999); Cane/l, 143 F.3d at 1213.
239. 433 F. Supp. 2d 811.
240. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
241. 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
242. Id. at 308.
243. Id. at 308 n.ll.
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presumed damages may possibly be appropriate. In those cir-
cumstances, presumed damages may roughly approximate the
harm that the plaintiff suffered and thereby compensate for
244harms that may be impossible to measure.
Damages possess an expressive significance. They are estima-
tions of the value of a constitutional right and of the person
asserting the right.245 As a normative accounting of how prisoners
should be treated, the PLRA's constraints on damages, including
those arising from retaliation, indicate that the drafters of the Act
possessed little regard for prisoners' rights.
IV. WHISTLEBLOWING BEHIND BARS
A. Surplus Power and Prisoners'Rights
The surplus power of prison staff lies at the core of retaliation.
The foremost disparity of power between the "keepers" and the
"kept" arose under the "slave of the state" doctrine246 of the
nineteenth century and its successor, the "hands-off' doctrine.247 As
one commentator observed, "[u]ntil the courts abandoned their
hands-off policy, wardens and their deputies held nearly unlimited
244. Id. at 310-11 (citations omitted).
245. See Robertson, supra note 51, at 28 ("Denial of inmates' rights constitutes 'rights
robbery,' and is thus worthy of public approbation [through the award of punitive dam-
ages].") (footnote omitted).
246. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 790 (1871) (stating that inmates
are but "slaves of the [s] tate"). But see Donald H. Wallace, Prisoners'Rights: Historical Views, in
CORRECTIONAL CONTEXTs 248, 248-52 (James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen eds.,
1997) (arguing that the Ruffin court did not represent the prevailing view of inmates).
247. For the greater half of the twentieth century, courts embraced a "hands-off" ap-
proach to prisoners' civil rights claims. See, e.g., Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir.
1967) (" [C] ourts will not interfere with the conduct, management and disciplinary control
of this type of institution except in extreme cases."); United States ex reL Atterbury v. Ragen,
237 E2d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 1956) ("We think that it is well settled that it is not the function
of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners.... .") (internal quota-
tion marks and citations omitted); Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1951)
("[C]ourts have no supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct of the various institu-
tions.... ."); Taylor v. United States, 179 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1950) ("It is not within the
province of the courts to supervise the treatment of prisoners in the penitentiary, but only to
deliver from prison those who are illegally detained there."); Shepherd v. Hunter, 163 E2d
872, 874 (10th Cir. 1947) ("[1It is not within the province of the courts to superintend the
treatment of prisoners in the penitentiary, but only to deliver from prison those who are
illegally detained there."); United States ex rel. Palmer v. Ragen 159 E2d 356, 358 (7th Cir.
1947) ("Under repeated decisions, state governmental bodies, who are charged with prose-
cution and punishment of offenders, are not to be interfered with except in case of
extraordinary circumstances.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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authority to administer their own system of punishments and
rewards."
2 4
With the demise of the hands-off approach in the late 1960s, 45
prisoners' rights expanded, which dramatically reduced the
power disparity between prison staff and inmates. However, com-
mencing in 1979, a host of Supreme Court rulings has halted and
reversed this trend.2 5" Commentators have described the current
248. JAMES G. Fox, ORGANIZATIONAL AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN MAXIMUM-SECURITY
PRISONS 13 (1982). See also, e.g., KENNETH J. PEAK, JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 218 (2d ed.
1998) ("Until the 1970s conditions in many prisons were almost insufferable for both staff
members and inmates...."); Richard McCleery, Communication Patterns as a Bases of Systems of
Authority and Power, in THEORETICAL STUDIES IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PRISON 49,
52 ("Control, rather than 'justice' in the familiar sense, was the object. Hence, there was no
place for a body of principles or 'constitutional' rights to restrain disciplinary procedure.");
James E. Robertson, Judicial Review of Prison Discipline in the United States and England: A Com-
parative Study of Due Process and Natural Justice, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1323, 1328 (1989)
("Correctional officials exercised virtually unlimited power over inmates prior to the
1970s.")
249. The factors leading to the demise of the hands-off doctrine included: (1) attorneys
committed to prison reform; (2) prison disturbances and riots that exposed the severe short-
comings of the penal system; and (3) the Supreme Court's commitment to advancing the
rights of powerless minority groups. See LYNN S. BRANHAM & SHELDON KRANTZ, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 283 (5th
ed. 1997).
250. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U S. 472, 483-85 (1995) (holding that procedural
safeguards arise when disciplinary sanctions are a "dramatic departure from the basic condi-
tions [of the sentence]" or impose "atypical and significant hardships"); Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (holding that deliberate indifference to a significant risk of inmate-
on-inmate assault constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (holding that staff's malicious use of force inflicts cruel and unusual pun-
ishment); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (holding that deliberate indifference to
basic human needs imposes cruel and unusual punishment); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401, 419 (1989) (holding that inmates possess a limited right to receive publications);
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1987) (holding that inmates possess a
limited right to religious freedom); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987) (holding that
inmates possess a limited right to receive and send correspondence); Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (holding that inmates possess a limited right to privacy); Vitek v.Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) (holding that transferring inmates to mental hospitals triggers
procedural safeguards); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979) (holding that pretrial de-
tainees cannot be punished); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828-29 (1977) (holding that
inmates possess a right of meaningful access to the courts); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976) (holding that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs inflicts cruel and
unusual punishment); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (holding that proce-
dural safeguards are triggered by threatened loss of good time, that is, the reduction of the
inmate's time-served based on statutory formula for crediting good behaviorO; Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (holding that inmates possess a limited right to practice religion);
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969) (holding that jailhouse lawyers possess limited
constitutional protection); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968) (per curiam)
(holding that racial segregation in prison violates equal protection except in emergencies).
251. In 1979 in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Supreme Court began a con-
certed effort to end the expansion of prisoners' rights by espousing a policy of deference to
prison staff:
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era as a "new" hands-off approach to prisoners by the courts. 252 It
breaks with its older counterpart by asserting that prisons have be-
come rational, bureaucratic institutions and as such treat inmates
fairly.253 Retaliation, however, represents a revolt against bureaucra-
tization and undermines the legitimacy of this model.
[Clourts must heed our warning that "[penal] considerations are peculiarly within
the province and professional expertise of correctional officials, and in the absence
of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that officials have exaggerated their
response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert
judgment in such matters."
Id. at 540 n.23 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)); see also Hedieh Nasheri,
A Spirit of Meanness: Courts, Prisons and Prisoners, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 1173, 1188-89 (1996-97)
("The turning point in the Court's approach to prison litigation occurred in 1979, the be-
ginning of the Deference Period. In Bell v. Wolfish, the Court dramatically altered the
framework for considering prisoners' constitutional claims.") (footnotes omitted).
After Bell, in case after case the Supreme Court disappointed prisoners' rights advocates.
See, e.g., Laura B. Meyers & Sue Titus Reid, Modem Prisons: 1960 to the Present, in ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 239, 243 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds., 1996)
("In the 1980s and 1990s, the pendulum appears to have shifted back with a more conserva-
tive Supreme Court once again emphasizing the need for institutional security, upholding
more restrictive administrative policies.").
Compare Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994) (ruling that prison conditions
inflict cruel and unusual punishment when (1) defendants evince deliberate indifference,
that is, actual knowledge of a high risk of injury; and (2) fail to respond in a reasonable
manner in light of that risk), with Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (ruling that
prison conditions, when considered in their totality, must be intolerable if they are to inflict
cruel and usual punishment; and implying that the defendant's state of mind is not relevant
for Eighth Amendment purposes); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995) (ruling
that state-created liberty interests are deprived by atypical, significant hardships), with Hewitt
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983) (ruling "that the repeated use of explicitly mandatory
language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates demands a conclusion
that the State has created a protected liberty interest").
252. See Mark Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and Due Deference: The New Hands Off Policy in
Correctional Litigation, 47 UMKC L. REv. 1, 5 (1978); Emily Calhoun, The Supreme Court and
the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 220 (1977);
Cheryl Dunn Giles, Note, Turner v. Safley and Its Progeny: A Gradual Retreat to the "Hands-Off'
Doctrine?, 35 ARiZ. L. REv. 219, 229-30 (1993).
253. See Robertson, supra note 40, at 182 ("The Supreme Court has attached great sig-
nificance to the rise of the bureaucratic prison. According to the Court, correctional staff
invariably exercise 'considered' judgment and their backgrounds ensure that they are
Itrained' in prison administration. Implicit in these characterizations is the assertion that we
can suspend the Constitution's distrust of governmental power when the conduct of prison
workers is at issue.") (footnotes omitted).
A bureaucratic organization is characterized by the following components:
1. Rulification and routinization. Organizations stress continuity. Rules save
effort by eliminating the need to derive a new solution for every situa-
tion. They also facilitate standard and equal treatment of similar
situations.
2. Division of Labor. Labor division involves marking off performance func-
tions as part of a systematic division of labor and providing the
necessary authority to perform these functions.
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At the onset of the prisoners' rights movement some of its sup-
porters touted prison grievance systems as a "better way" of
safeguarding inmates from abuse.5 4 They did not foresee the emer-
gence of a new, transformative adjudicative model: structural
reform. Whereas the passive "received tradition" of judging envis-
aged adjudication as "deciding" the dispute and "declaring" what
the law would be in the future, 5 the structural reform model re-
cast the trial judge as the "creator and manager of complex forms
of ongoing relief."25 6 By 1990, structural reform adjudication had
ameliorated unconstitutional prison conditions to a degree un-
precedented in the history of the American prison. 25 ' Feeley and
Hanson described this now bygone era of judicially-driven prison
reform as "perhaps second in breadth and detail only to the courts'
earlier role in dismantling segregation in the nation's public
schools."
2 1
Grievance procedures only acquired prominence with the pas-
sage of the controversial Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). By
requiring inmates to exhaust administrative remedies and thus use
the grievance process, even in those instances in which those
remedies did not include the relief sought by prisoners, 20 the
3. Hierarchy of authority. The organization of offices follows the principle of
hierarchy; each office is under the control and supervision of a higher
one.
4. Expertise. Specialized training is necessary. It is thus normally true that
only a person who has demonstrated an adequate technical training is
qualified to be a member of the administrative staff.
5. Written rules. Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated
and recorded. in writing.
PEAK, supra note 248, at 23 (footnote omitted).
254. Linda R. Singer & J. Michael Keating, Prisoner Grievance Mechanisms: A Better Way
than Violence, Litigation, and Unlimited Administrative Discretion, CRIME & DELINQ. 367 (1973).
255. Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (pt. III), 36 HARV. L. REv. 940, 943
(1923). But see Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and Extraordinary in
Institutional Reform Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REv. 465, 467 (1980) (contending that the novelty
in structural reform litigation lies not in the remedy but in "undreamed-of entitlements").
256. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281,
1284 (1976).
257. See, e.g., TODD R. CLEAR & GEORGE F. COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 410 (4th ed.
1997) (concluding that judicial review had abated the most vile features of prison life);John
J. Dilulio, Jr., Conclusion: What Judges Can Do to Improve Prisons and Jails, in COURTS, CORREC-
TIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 287, 291 (John J. Dilulio, Jr. ed., 1990) (characterizing
judicial intervention as a "qualified success").
258. Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson, The Impact ofjudicial Intervention on Prisons
and Jails: A Framework for Analysis and a Review of the Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND
THE CONSTITUTION 13 (John D. DiIulio,Jr., ed. 1990).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006). The PLRA does not specify how soon a grievance
must be heard. See id.
260. See supra note 25 (briefly discussing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006), and Booth
v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739, (2001)). Prior to Booth, the Second Circuit indicated that re-
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drafters of the Act sought to curb structural reform adjudication2 61
and frivolous filings. 62 The rate of filings has since dropped some
60% per 1,000 inmates, but at a high price: "The resulting harm is
not only to the claimants in the particular cases that have been
dismissed notwithstanding their constitutional merit. The harm is
to the entire system of accountability that ensures that prison and
jail officials comply with constitutional mandates."
2 63
taliation could estop defendants from raising the non-exhaustion defense. See Hemphill v.
New York, 380 F.3d 680, 689 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that "it is possible that some individual
defendant [prison staff] may be estopped" from raising non-exhaustion because of threat-
ened retaliation should the plaintiff proceed with the grievance he filed); Ziemba v. Wezner,
366 F.3d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 2004) ("As a matter of first impression in this circuit, we... hold
that the affirmative defense of exhaustion is subject to estoppel" when prison officials
threatened retaliation should the inmate file a grievance); cf. Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260
F.3d 357, 358 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that "[t]he 42 U.S.C. § 1997e exhaustion require-
ment is not jurisdictional and may be subject to certain defenses such as waiver, estoppel or
equitable tolling"). After the Ngo ruling, the Second Circuit in Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37
(2d Cir. 2007), continued to cite Woodford and Ziemba as applicable precedent regarding the
application of estoppel when threatened retaliation deterred the plaintiff from exhausting
administrative remedies. Id. at 41 ("The court should also inquire as to ... whether the
defendants' own actions inhibiting the inmate's exhaustion of remedies may estop one or
more of the defendants from raising the plaintiff's failure to exhaust as a defense.") (quot-
ing Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 686).
261. 141 CONG. REc. S14419 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham), re-
printed in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1996, PUB. L.
No. 104-134, supra note 16, at doc. 15141 ("[N]o longer will prison administration be
turned over to Federal judges for the indefinite future for the slightest reason."); Kincade v.
Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The text of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
itself reflects that the drafters' primary objective was to curb prison condition litigation.").
262. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (urging legislation to "bring relief to a civil justice system overburdened by frivolous
prisoner lawsuits"), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM
ACT OF 1996, PUB. L. No. 104-134, supra note 16, at doc. 14; Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d
1483, 1488 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Congress promulgated the Act to curtail abusive prisoner ...
litigation."); United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1997) ("The main pur-
pose of the Prison Litigation Reform Act was to curtail abusive prison-condition litigation.");
Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The legislation was aimed at the
skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners-many of which are meritless-and the
corresponding burden those filings have placed on the federal courts."); Santana v. United
States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Congress enacted the PLRA primarily to curtail
claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Torts Claims Act, most
of which concern prison conditions and many of which are routinely dismissed as legally
frivolous.").
263. Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America's Prisons:
The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act (American Constitution Society Issue
Brief, Mar. 2007), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Schlanger%2Shay%20PLRA%
20Paper%203-28-07.pdf. As Schlanger observed, irrespective of retaliation, the PLRA en-
hanced the surplus power of prison staff by according them great discretion in mechanics of
the grievance process:
[T]he PLRA imposes no constraints on the structure or rules of any grievance proc-
essing regime. The administrative review scheme can, for example, have as short a
deadline for inmates and as many layers of review (to each of which the inmate must
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Through its exhaustion requirement, the Act has favorably in-
fluenced the cost-benefit ratio of correctional officer retaliation by
enhancing the benefit. First, the filing of a grievance identifies tar-
gets who may seek judicial relief for officer misconduct. Second,
retaliation against the targets acquires a functional quality, to wit,
the prospect of deterring the target from filing suit and deterring
other inmates from filing grievances. Third, by forbidding damages
for mental or emotional suffering absent a causally-related physical
• • 261
injury, the Act effectively immunizes retaliatory measures from
compensatory damage awards if they stop short of physical injury.
Consequently, retaliation weakens the two intended functions of
a grievance system: to safeguards inmates from governmental
abuse and neglect without resorting to lengthy and frequently inef-
fective litigation;265 and to "absorb the ... outrage" felt by inmates,
which a generation ago fueled structural reform adjudication. 6
Grievance-motivated retaliation deters inmates from filing griev-
ances and itself generates litigation, as evidenced by the growing
case law on this topic. 67 This Article advocates reform grounded in
a new perspective of grieving inmates.
apply) as the incarcerating authority chooses. Essentially, then, the sky's the limit for
the procedural complexity or difficulty of the exhaustion regime.
Schlanger, supra note 16, at 1650-51 (footnotes omitted); cf id. at 1649 ("The PLRA's ex-
haustion requirement has emerged as the highest hurdle the statute presents to individual
inmate plaintiffs.").
264. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006) (stating that "[n]o federal civil action may be brought
by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emo-
tional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury") (emphasis
added).
265. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (stating that "only scant 3.1 percent have enough merit to reach trial"), reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1996, PUB. L. No. 104-
134 supra note 16, at doc. 14; StewartJ. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitu-
tional Tort Litigation: The Influence of Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 719, 730 (1988) (finding that 17% of the inmate filings in three federal
districts met a broad definition of "success"). Inmates who do prevail at trial typically receive
scant damages. See Schlanger, supra note 16, at 1606 (concluding that "juries were reluctant
to award damages to inmates unless the conduct alleged was proven extremely egregious"),
at 1622 (documenting "the low amount of damages awarded to inmate plaintiffs in their
rare litigated victories").
266. Rebecca L. Bordt & Michael C. Musheno, Bureaucratic Co-optation of Informal Dispute
Processing: Social Control as an Effect of Inmate Grievance Policy, 25J. Ras. CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 18
(1988).
267. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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B. Grieving and Whistleblowing
Inmates who file grievances about matters of public importance
become the penal counterpart of civilian, governmental whistle-
blowers. The two groups share several characteristics. Like
whistleblowers, inmates experiencing retaliation sometimes possess
information that has not been disseminated publicly; like whistle-
blowers, inmates acquire this information because of their
institutional membership; and inmates and whistleblowers alike
function as intermediaries by providing information to a third
party, be it a government watchdog agency, a court, or, because of
the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA, a grievance officer.6s
Furthermore, both whistleblowers and inmates face retaliation be-
cause they reside in institutions that do not readily tolerate
dissent.269
By residing in a "total institution"-where all aspects of their
existence, "24-7," occur under the control of the state 70--inmates
live in a self-contained community, not unlike a small city. To
maintain the daily operation of that small city, inmates have
historically performed many maintenance and administrative
duties central to the day-to-day operations of the prison.271 By virtue
268. SeeJonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of Whis-
tleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1899, 1912 (2007) (comparing
whistleblowers to inside traders). But see Marcia A. Parmerlee et al., Correlates of Whistleblower
Perceptions of Organizational Retaliation, 27 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 17, 17 (1982) (observing that
"there has been little scholarly inquiry into the characteristics common to whistle-blowers").
269. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sar-
banes-Oxey, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 365 (2003) (stating that "the Government Accountability
Project[] found that about ninety percent of whistleblowers are subjected to reprisals or
threats").;
270. GOFEMAN, supra note 27, at 1-124.
271. See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic
Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REv. 857 (2008).
Although laments over the "idleness" of prisoners are not uncommon, well over
600,000, and probably close to a million, inmates are working full time in jails and
prisons throughout the United States. Perhaps some of them built your desk chair:
office furniture, especially in state universities and the federal government, is a major
prison labor product. Inmates also take hotel reservations at corporate call centers,
make body armor for the U.S. military, and manufacture prison chic fashion accesso-
ries, in addition to the iconic task of stamping license plates.
Id. at 868 (footnotes omitted); see also, e.g., Brian Hauck, Prison Labor, 37 HARv.J. ON LEGIS.
279, 279 (2000) (stating that "[p]rison labor is almost as old as prisons"); JamesJ. Misrahi,
Factories With Fences: An Ana4ysis of the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program in Histori-
cal Perspective, 33 Am. CRiM. L. REV. 411, 413 (1996) ("The history of American prisons is also
the history of labor in prisons. Inmate idleness was not simply a concomitant problem of incar-
ceration but rather a cause of deviant behavior. Work was therefore considered necessary to
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of their housekeeping functions, inmates live as both institutional
residents and workers, which situates them to experience, observe,
or otherwise detect improper, criminal, or unconstitutional
practices by correctional staff. Moreover, the jailhouse lawyers
within their ranks sometimes possess familiarity with the
administrative, statutory, and constitutional constraints that ought
to govern prisons.272 Consequently, inmates filing grievances
alleging institutional wrongdoing expose themselves to substantial
risk of retaliation by the "other" workers: prison employees with
supervisory authority over inmates. Moreover, without the
oversight of "whisteblowing" inmates, wrongdoing would not likely
273be detected because of the correctional officer code of silence.
Unlike their civilian counterparts employed by the United States
government, inmate "whistleblowers" enjoy none of the protec-
274tions of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 19894. This Act
shields a federal employee from a retaliatory personnel action
for disclosing what the employee reasonably believes are viola-
tions of law or instances of gross mismanagement.... When
the employee proves that the agency manager taking the adverse action
knew of the disclosure, and the discipline's timing is such that a rea-
sonable person could believe that the disclosure contributed to it, the
agency must prove by clear and convincing evidence it would have
taken the same action in the absence of the protected disclosure.
Because inmates using the grievance process function as de facto
whistleblowers when addressing matters of public importance, this
Article recommends the revision of grievance procedures so as to
instill discipline in the inmate and to set him onto the path of righteousness through an
institutional routine.") (footnotes omitted).
272. SeejiM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION (1988), who posits the following about jail-
house lawyers:
First, they take their jobs ... seriously.... Second, their tasks fill both a legal and in-
stitutional void in which they serve a variety of unmet prisoner needs. Third, they
clearly do not, as a group, either file or encourage the "frivolous suit," as critics
charge.... Finally, conspicuously absent from their story (and from observations) are
connections with outside political activists.
Id. at 242; see also supra note 73 (defining "jailhouse lawyers").
273. See supra note 49 and accompanying test (discussing solidarity among correctional
officers and the ostracism experienced by officers who transgress it).
274. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, § 3(a) (13), 103 Stat. 29
(1989).
275. William Dorsey, An Overview of Whistleblower Protection Claims at the United States De-
partment of Labor, 26 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 43, 58 (2006) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
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include the most important protections provided by the Whistle-
blower Protect Act. First, grievance procedures should include a
rebuttable presumption of retaliation if the grieving inmate ex-
periences unscheduled adversities for a reasonable period-for
276
example, sixty days-following the filing of a grievance. Second,
clear and convincing evidence of a legitimate basis for the adverse
action in question would rebut the presumption. While a presump-
tion might encourage the filing of frivolous grievances, explicit
rules making a baseless grievance filing a disciplinary violation
could deter such conduct.
Moreover, the protections given whistleblowing inmates should
include a meaningful remedy if the officers in question fail to over-
come the rebuttable presumption of retaliation. The remedy ought
to address two objectives: making the aggrieved inmate "whole" by,
for example, restoring lost wages should a retaliatory sanction de-
prive him of his prison job; and deterring future acts of retaliation
by imposing administrative sanctions, such as a letter of reprimand
or a monetary judgment, sufficient to alter the now favorable cost-
benefit ratio.
276. Cf Maureen S. Binetti et al., The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Have Its Exceptions Swal-
lowed the Rule, in HANDLING WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS 2000, at 517 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice, Order No. HO-0050, 2000).
Hospital Workers Protected From Retaliation
California governor Gray Davis recently signed a bill (S.B. 97) purposed to protect
hospital employees and patients from retaliation or discrimination for whistleblowing
about hospital conditions and/or practices. This legislation has been recognized as creat-
ing a "rebuttable presumption" that discriminatory treatment by a healthcare organization taken
against an employee within 120 days after a complaint is filed, is retaliation. 1999 CA S.B. 97
S.N.
Id. at 636 (emphasis added); see also Valerie P. Kirk & Ann Clarke Snell, The Texas Whistle-
blower Act: Timefora Change, 26 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 75 (1995).
The current Whistleblower Act contains a presumption that an employee suspended
or terminated within ninety days after making a report was suspended or terminated
in retaliation for making that report. Only one other state, South Carolina, had this
presumption, but the South Carolina legislature dropped the presumption in its 1993
revisions. This leaves Texas as the sole state providing what has been termed as an "in-
centive" for whistleblowers. One court has analyzed the weight of this presumption,
stating it is an "ordinary" rebuttable presumption or a presumption "which can stand
only in the absence of evidence to the contrary." However, even an ordinary rebut-
table presumption shifts the burden of proof unfairly when an employer has
legitimate reasons for taking adverse personnel action. This presumption should be
eliminated or counteracted with another provision protecting employers when a case
involves mixed motives.
Id. at 99 (footnotes omitted).
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CONCLUSION
Does the Constitution provide the foundation for a just prison?
Before the demise of the hands-off doctrine, surely not. 77 Since
then, the efficacy of litigated reform has been much debated .2 Yet,
as Stuart Scheingold has asserted, "the myth of rights"-that the
Constitution provides the basis for "a just political order"279-has
prevailed both in and out of prison. Prisoners have a particularly
strong incentive to embrace this myth. Powerless and despised, 80
can they look elsewhere for relief?
Yet Congress, in enacting the Prison Litigation Reform Act, as-
serted that inmates can indeed look elsewhere-to grievance
mechanisms created by and administered by "the man." Retaliation
by prison staff undermines this expectation. Retaliation remains
deeply engrained in the correctional officer subculture; it may well
be the normative response when an inmate files a grievance.2s' The
commonplace nature of retaliation demonstrates that correc-
tional officers still command too much surplus power some forty
years after the demise of the hands-off doctrine. Although the
PLRA-mandated grievance process provides a venue for com-
plaints, including those about extra-legal uses of surplus power,
the Act provides no protection from retaliation during exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies;282 and, should a federal court
277. See, e.g., NORMAN A. CARLSON ET AL., CORRECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 502
(1999) (observing that the hands-off doctrine caused some inmates to "suffer[] under con-
ditions of squalor and inhumane treatment by correctional personnel and had nowhere to
turn for help"); PEAK, supra note 248, at 218 ("Until the 1970s conditions in many prisons
were almost insufferable for both staff members and inmates...."); THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 159 (1967) ("Life in many institutions is at best barren and futile,
at worst unspeakably brutal and degrading.").
278. See, e.g., CLEAR & COLE, supra note 257, at 410 (concluding that judicial review had
abated the most vile features of prison life); Dilulio, supra note 257, at 291 (characterizing
judicial intervention as a "qualified success").
279. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 23 (2nd ed. 2004).
280. Robertson, supra note 13, at 124-40 (2000) (describing inmates as a largely black
subgroup that experiences racial segregation, prejudice, disenfranchisement, and impover-
ishment); see also, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 288 (1993) ("Incarcerated criminal offenders constitute a despised minority with-
out political power to influence the policies of legislative and executive officials."). But see,
e.g., U.S. v. King, 62 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Prisoners are not a suspect class."); Wil-
son v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1992) ("But prisoners are not a suspect class.");
Pryor v. Brennan, 914 E2d 921, 923 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Prisoners do not constitute a suspect
class.").
281. See supra notes 18-51 and accompanying text (examining the causes and frequency
of correctional officer retaliation).
282. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006) (stating that "[n]o action shall be brought with re-
spect to prison conditions under section 1983 ... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
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eventually sustain a complaint of unconstitutional retaliation, the
Act precludes damages for mental or emotional injuries in the ab-
2813
sence of physical harm.
The burden now rests on state departments of corrections to
end retaliation. Measures such as those recommended in this Arti-
cle could severely diminish the surplus power held by correctional
officers that makes retaliation a common and efficacious deterrent
of legitimate inmate complaints of mistreatment.28 4 But for now,
inmates pondering the pros and cons of grieving should expect the
worst.
or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are ex-
hausted").
283. Id. § 1997e(e) (stating that "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner
confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suf-
fered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury") (emphasis added).
284. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to which fear
of retaliation deters legitimate complaints).
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